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JOHANNS v. LIVESTOCK MARKETING ASS’N:  
DEMISE OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION  
AGAINST COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH  
 
EDWARD J. SCHOEN∗ 
MARGARET M. HOGAN∗∗ 





On May 23, 2005, the United States Supreme Court in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n.529 
(hereinafter referred to as Livestock Marketing) ruled that the United States Department of 
Agriculture (hereinafter referred to as USDA) did not violate the First Amendment rights of beef 
producers and ranchers by requiring them to contribute funds to support generic advertisements for 
beef,530 because the generic advertisements in question constituted the Government’s own 
speech.531  Mandated by the Beef Promotion and Research Act,532 the advertisements were funded 
through a $1 assessment fee per head of cattle sold.533  Two associations of beef producers and 
several individuals who raise and sell cattle objected unsuccessfully to the assessment on the 
grounds that the beef advertisements violated their First Amendment,534 because the 
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529 Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 125 S. Ct. 2055 (2005). 
530 Id. at 2066. 
531 Id. at 2058. 
532 Id. (“The statute directs the Secretary of Agriculture to implement this policy by issuing a Beef Promotion 
and Research Order (Beef Order or Order), § 2903, and specifies four key terms it must contain: The 
Secretary is to appoint a Cattlemen’s Beef Promotion and Research Board (Beef Board or Board), whose 
members are to be a geographically representative group of beef producers and importers, nominated by 
trade associations.  § 2904(1).  The Beef Board is to convene an Operating Committee, composed of 10 Beef 
Board members and 10 representatives named by a federation of state beef councils.  § 2904(4)(A).  The 
Secretary is to impose a $1-per-head assessment (or “checkoff”) on all sales or importation of cattle and a 
comparable assessment on imported beef products.  § 2904(8).  And the assessment is to be used to fund 
beef-related projects, including promotional campaigns, designed by the operating Committee and approved 
by the Secretary.  §§ 904(4)(B), (C).”) 
533 Id.  Many of the advertisements used the trademarked slogan, “Beef.  It’s What’s for Dinner.”  Id. at 2059.   
534 Id. at 2059-2060. 
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advertisements promoted beef as a generic commodity and interfered with their efforts to promote 
the superiority of particular types of beef.535 
Livestock Marketing is the third disparate decision of the United States Supreme Court in the 
past eight years involving compelled commercial speech.  Four years earlier, the United States 
Supreme Court ruled in United States v. United Foods, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as United 
Foods),536 that the assessments imposed on mushroom growers to pay for generic advertisements 
promoting the mushroom industry under the Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer 
Information Act of 1990537 violated First Amendment protections against compelled speech538 and 
compulsory financing of speech.539  Four years before United Foods, the United States Supreme 
Court decided in Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc.540 (hereinafter referred to as Wileman 
Bros.) that compulsory contributions to a generic advertising campaign promoting California tree 
fruits (nectarines, peaches and plums) did not violate the First Amendment rights of the fruit 
producers.541   
In order to set the stage for the analysis of Livestock Marketing, section II of this article will 
briefly sketch the broad First Amendment background that provides a matrix for examining 
Livestock Marketing.  More particularly, because the beef, mushroom and fruit producers objected 
that they were forced to be associated with, and to contribute financially to, commercial messages 
with which they disagreed, this article will examine the leading United States Supreme Court 
decisions providing First Amendment protection against compelled political speech and 
compulsory financing of political or ideological views.  Likewise, the use of mandatory student 
fees to support student’s publications containing expression to which some students object is 
analogous to mandatory contributions to advertisements to which the food producers objected.  
Hence this article will also consider the leading United States Supreme Court decisions that 
examined the First Amendment implications of state-related universities utilizing mandatory 
student fees to support student organizations and expression, and upheld the use of mandatory 
student fees to support student activities and publications.  Part III of this article sketches the 
trajectory of the Supreme Court compelled commercial speech decisions culminating in Livestock 
Marketing, providing an analysis that assesses whether the First Amendment protections against 
compelled political or ideological speech and compelled financing of political or ideological 
speech continue to hold sway in the commercial speech arena.542  Part IV of this article concludes 
that further attempts to apply First Amendment restrictions against compelled political speech to 
the commercial arena will be futile, and predicts that legitimate attempts to challenge advertising 
programs mandated by government agencies will be thwarted by the Court’s endorsement of the 
defense of government speech. 
 
 
                                                   
535 Id. (“Respondents noted that the advertising promotes beef as a generic commodity, which, they contended, 
impedes their efforts to promote the superiority of, inter alia, American beef, grain-fed beef, or certified 
Angus or Hereford beef.”). 
536 United States v. United Foods, 121 S. Ct. 2334 (2001).   
537 Mushroom Promotion, Research and Consumer Information Act, 104 Stat. 3854, 7 U.S.C. § 6101.  
538 United Foods at 2341.   
539 Id. at 2338. 
540 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997). 
541 Id. at 469. 
542 Much of the analysis found in parts II and III of the article is based upon research appearing in prior 
publications of the authors.  See Edward J. Schoen and Margaret M. Hogan, Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & 
Elliott, Inc.: A Nettle in the Fruit Patch, 28 ACAD. OF LEGAL STUD. IN BUS. NAT’L PROC. 165-180 (1999); 
Edward J. Schoen et. al., Glickman v. Wileman Bros.: California Fruit Marketing Orders Prune the First 
Amendment, 10 WIDENER J. PUB. L., 21 (2000); and Edward J. Schoen et. al., United Foods and Wileman 
Bros.: Protection Against Compelled Commercial Speech–Now You See It, Now You Don’t, 39 AMER. BUS. 
L. J. 467 (2002).   
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II. THE BACKGROUND 
 
A. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST  
COMPELLED POLITICAL SPEECH 
 
The fruit growers and mushroom and beef producers objected to being forced to pay for and be 
associated with advertisements promoting products they did not grow, produce or sell.  The basis 
of their objections was the First Amendment protection not only to express and craft opinions and 
viewpoints, but also to avoid being associated with the viewpoints of others.    
The United States Supreme Court has strongly endorsed First Amendment protections against 
compelled political or ideological speech on at least five occasions.  In West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette (hereinafter referred to as Barnette),543 the Court decided that compelling 
teachers and students to participate in salute-to-the-flag ceremonies violated the First 
Amendment,544 because they were required to publicly demonstrate acceptance of the political 
ideas symbolized by the flag by saluting and pledging allegiance to it.545  The Court emphatically 
struck down mandatory salute-to-the-flag ceremonies: “If there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox 
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or 
act their faith therein.”546 
The United States Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in Wooley v. Maynard 
(hereinafter referred to as Maynard).547  In Maynard, a married couple covered the state motto 
“Live Free or Die” on their New Hampshire license plate, because it was contrary to their religious 
and moral beliefs, and sought declaratory judgment that the statute mandating that the slogan 
appear on the license plate and making it a misdemeanor to obscure the state motto violated the 
First Amendment.  The Court ruled that New Hampshire cannot constitutionally force an 
individual to display and disseminate an ideological message with which they disagree.548  The 
rights of individuals “to avoid becoming the courier” of messages contrary to their beliefs 
outweighed any interest of the state to promote an appreciation of state history and to foment state 
pride.549 
In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of N.C., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Riley),550 the 
United States Supreme Court decided that the North Carolina Charitable Solicitations Act 
(hereinafter referred to as “the Solicitations Act”) unconstitutionally infringed on free speech.  The 
Solicitations Act required professional fundraisers to inform solicited donors of the percentage of 
gross of revenues retained in previous charitable solicitations.551  Because the solicitation of 
charitable contributions is protected speech, state mandated disclosure requirements imposed on 
                                                   
543 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
544 The punishment inflicted on students who refused to participate in salute-to-the-flag ceremonies was 
expulsion.  Readmission was denied until the student complied with the policy.  Id at 629. 
545 Id. at 633, 634.  (“The “Bill of Rights which guards the individual’s right to speak his own mind [does not 
permit] public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind.”). 
546 Id. at 641. 
547 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
548 Id. at 713.  This ruling was founded on the correlative propositions inherent in the right to speak:  
[T]he right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the 
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.  A system which secures the right to 
proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to 
foster such concepts.  The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary 
components of the broader concept of “individual freedom of mind.”  [citations omitted].  Id. at 716-17. 
549 Id. at 715-17. 
550 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
551 Id. at 784. 
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fundraisers must pass muster under the First Amendment. 552  The Court in Riley struck down the 
mandated disclosure requirement, because the Solicitations Act required professional fundraisers to 
engage in “compelled speech” and North Carolina had not advanced a sufficient state interest to 
justify the required disclosure.553   
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston (hereinafter referred to 
as Hurley),554 the United States Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the South Boston Allied 
War Veterans Council (hereinafter referred to as the Veterans Council), an unincorporated 
association of individuals who organize the annual St. Patrick’s-Evacuation Day Parade 
(hereinafter referred to as the parade), could not be compelled to allow the Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB), a social organization of homosexuals, bisexuals 
and their supporters, to march in the parade.555  The Court noted that the First Amendment protects 
the rights of individuals to craft their own multifaceted message, and decided that the Veterans 
Council was entitled to such protection in selecting the contingents appearing in the parade.556  The 
Court further held that applying the state’s public accommodation law to the parade forced the 
Veterans Council “to alter the expressive content of their parade,”557 and violated “the fundamental 
rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the 
content of his own message.”558   
Finally, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,559 the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Boy 
Scouts of America (hereinafter referred to as the BSA) was not required by New Jersey’s public 
accommodations law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to reinstate an 
adult assistant scoutmaster,560 who was an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist.561  A 
private, nonprofit organization whose mission is to instill its system of values in young people562 
and to provide a positive moral code for living,563 the BSA maintains that homosexual conduct is 
contrary to the moral values it promotes,564 believes homosexuals do not provide a desirable role 
model consistent with its moral values,565 and refuses to permit homosexuals to become members 
                                                   
552 Id. at 789, citing Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (invalidating a local 
ordinance requiring charitable solicitors to use, for charitable purposes 75% of the funds solicited), and 
Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984) (invalidating statute prohibiting 
charitable solicitation contracts in which the fundraiser retained more than 25% of the money collected). 
553 Riley at 798 (“We believe, therefore, that North Carolina’s content-based regulation is subject to exacting 
First Amendment scrutiny.  The State asserts as its interest the importance of informing donors how the 
money they contribute is spent in order to dispel the alleged misperception that the money they give to a 
professional fundraisers go in greater-than-actual proportion to benefit charity.  To achieve this goal, the 
State has adopted a prophylactic rule of compelled speech, applicable to all professional solicitations.  We 
conclude that this interest is not as weighty as the State asserts, and that the means chosen to accomplish it 
are unduly burdensome and not narrowly tailored.”)  
554 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
555 Id. at 560, 580-81. 
556 Id.  
557 Id. at 572-73. 
558 Id. at 573.  The Court continued:  
Indeed, this general rule, that the speaker has the right to tailor the speech, applies not only to expressions of 
value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid, subject, 
perhaps, to the permissive law of defamation.  Nor is the rule’s benefit restricted to the press, being enjoyed 
by business corporations generally and by ordinary people engaged in unsophisticated expression as well as 
by professional publishers.  Its point is simply the point of all speech protection, which is to shield just those 
choices of content that in someone’s eyes are misguided, or even hurtful. Id. at 573-74. 
559 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
560 Id. at 661. 
561 Id. at 644. 
562 Id. at 649. 
563 Id. at 650. 
564 Id. at 650-51. 
565 Id. at 652. 
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or leaders of the BSA.566  The court decided that requiring the BSA to reinstate a community 
leader and gay rights activist to his position of assistant scout master “would, at the very least, 
force [the BSA] to send a message, both to the youth members and the world, that [the BSA] 
accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior,”567 undermines the BSA’s official 
position with respect to homosexual conduct,568 and associates the BSA with a message it chooses 
not to send,569 contrary to the First Amendment.  In short, the First Amendment supports the 
BSA’s refusal to be associated with a message or communication contrary to the organization’s 
core values and mission. 
The five United States Supreme Court opinions discussed above are remarkably dissimilar, each 
involving different messages and means of expression.  In combination, however, the five cases 
give meaningful protection under the First Amendment to express and tailor views and opinions, to 
avoid association with expressions of others, and to “guarantee that no government official can 
proscribe orthodoxy in thought or opinion, or compel an individual by word or act to express, 
participate, or concur in the dissemination of the ideas or messages of others.”570 
 
B. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS AGAINST  
COMPELLED FINANCING OF POLITICAL SPEECH 
 
Because the beef, mushroom and fruit producers protested that they were wrongfully forced to 
pay for advertisements for food products that they could not market or sell, it is useful to review 
United States Supreme Court decisions establishing significant First Amendment protection 
against compelled financing of political or ideological speech to ascertain whether those rights are 
transferable to the commercial arena. 
In International Association of Machinists v. Street (hereinafter referred to as Street),571 the 
Court ruled that, under the First Amendment, union dues could be used to support collective 
bargaining activities, but could not be used to finance the political campaigns of candidates for 
public office or to promote political causes, doctrines and ideas without the agreement of dues-
paying members.572   
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (hereinafter referred to as Abood),573 the United States 
Supreme Court unanimously upheld a Michigan statute permitting union representation of local 
government employees under an “agency shop” arrangement, in which every employee was 
represented by the union and non-union members were required to pay a service charge equal in 
amount to union dues.574  The assessment of such service charges to finance collective bargaining 
did not violate the First Amendment rights of the non-union members, but was justified by the 
labor relations system established by Congress.575  Notably, however, the union was prohibited 
from requiring employees to contribute to the support of political or ideological causes they 
opposed as a condition of employment as public school teachers.576  Using union members’ 
                                                   
566 Id.  
567 Id. at 653. 
568 Id. at 655. 
569 Id. at 656. 
570 Schoen et al, United Foods and Wileman Bros.: Protection Against Compelled Commercial Speech–Now 
You See It, Now You Don’t, supra note 14, at 475.   
571 Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). 
572 Id. at 746. 765, 767, 768.  The funds could be used to defray the expenses of the negotiation or 
administration of collective agreements, or the expenses entailed in the adjustment of grievances and 
disputes. 
573 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
574 Id. at 220.  See DONALD M. GILLMOR et al., MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS, at 151 
(5th ed. 1990). 
575 Abood, 431 U.S. at 221-22. 
576 Id. 
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compulsory contributions for political purposes violated their First Amendment rights,577 because 
they were compelled to support a political viewpoint as a condition of public employment.578   
In Keller v. State Bar of California (hereinafter referred to as Keller),579 the United States 
Supreme Court unanimously held that requiring members of the State Bar of California 
(hereinafter referred to as the State Bar) to pay dues that are used to fund political and ideological 
causes with which lawyers disagreed, violated their First Amendment rights.  Those expenditures 
were used to support lobbying, to file amicus curiae briefs, and to organize annual State Bar 
conferences,580 and had nothing to do with regulating the legal profession or improving legal 
services.581  The United States Supreme Court determined that the relationship between the 
lawyers and the State Bar was similar to that of union members and their unions.582  This permitted 
the Court to apply the Abood analysis to the State Bar’s use of member dues583 and to determine 
that lawyers should be required to pay the cost of regulating the profession and improving the 
educational and ethical standards of its members,584 but could not be compelled to support through 
their dues political or ideological activities unrelated to the purpose of regulating and improving 
the legal profession.585   
Street, Abood, and Keller provide significant protection from compelled financing of political or 
ideological speech under the First Amendment.  Union workers, public school teachers, and 
practicing lawyers cannot be required to pay dues to support political viewpoints with which they 
disagree, to contribute to causes they oppose as a condition of employment, or to disseminate ideas 
or positions unrelated to improving their profession.  The First Amendment not only preserves 
freedom to express opinions and avoid association with the expressions of others, but also protects 
all individuals from being compelled to finance the viewpoints of others.586   
 
C. MANDATORY STUDENT FEES TO SUPPORT EXTRACURRICULAR  
ACTIVITIES AND PUBLICATIONS 
 
In Livestock Marketing, United Foods, and Wileman Bros., the beef, mushroom and fruit 
producers objected to government-mandated contributions to support advertisements for food 
products they did not produce or were prohibited from producing.  Analogously, the United States 
Supreme Court has twice ruled on the First Amendment implications of state-related universities’ 
                                                   
577 Id. at 235. 
578 Id. The Court’s holding in Abood was reiterated in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 520-21 
(1991). 
579 Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990). 
580 Id.  
581 Id. at 5, 14-15. 
582 Id. at 12. 
583 Id. at 9, 13-14. 
584 Id. at 12-13. 
585 Id. at 13-14.  The Court also notes that compliance with Abood and Keller is neither difficult nor 
burdensome.  Rather, the constitutional requirements for the collection and use of fees are providing an 
adequate explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the 
fee before an impartial decision maker, and an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute while such 
challenges are pending.  Id. at 16.  See Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986). 
586 Additional support for this proposition exists in two United States Supreme Court decisions dealing with 
First Amendment protection of public utility political speech: Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 544 (1980) (the order of the New York Public Service Commission 
that prohibits the inclusion of inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy in the monthly bills 
mailed to public utility companies to its customers violated the First Amendment); and Pacific Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. Publ. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 543 (1986) (the order of the California Public Utilities 
Commission requiring Pacific Gas and Electric Company to include communications with ratepayers 
prepared by a public interest organization in its billing envelopes violated the First Amendment).  Both of 
these decisions provide strong protection to the political speech of regulated utilities.   
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charging mandatory student activities fees to support student activities and publications.  The First 
Amendment implications of mandatory student activity fees are best understood from two 
perspectives: (1) whether the university can refuse to fund certain publications from student 
activity fees because of the content or viewpoint of the publications; and (2) whether university 
students can insist that the student activity fees they pay can be withheld from supporting student 
publications with which they disagree. 
The first perspective is provided by Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia 
(hereinafter referred to as Rosenberger),587 in which the United States Supreme Court ruled that 
the University of Virginia violated the First Amendment by withholding payment authorization to 
an outside contractor for printing a student newspaper promoting Christian values and 
viewpoints.588  The newspaper was produced by Wide Awake Productions, a student organization 
recognized and sanctioned by the university.589  Under university guidelines, recognized student 
organizations were permitted to submit disbursement requests to pay outside contractors for 
expenses related to student news, information and opinion; however, expenses related to religious 
activities were excluded from the disbursement request program.590  Wide Awake Publications 
submitted a disbursement request to pay its printer $5,862 for the cost of printing its newspaper,591 
but the university denied the request because of the religious perspective of the newspaper.592 
The United States Supreme Court ruled that the University of Virginia’s refusal to pay the 
publication costs of the student newspaper because it promoted Christianity constituted 
government-imposed viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment.593  Having 
established a “limited public forum” for the expression of various student viewpoints through its 
disbursement request procedures,594 the university was prohibited by the First Amendment from 
excluding Wide Awake Publications because of its advocacy of a Christian perspective.595  
Furthermore, the use of student fees to pay publication costs for a student newspaper promoting a 
Christian perspective does not violate the Establishment Clause, because the university’s student 
activities fee, unlike taxes levied for direct support of a church or group of churches, was “neutral 
toward religion.”596 
The second perspective–whether university students can insist that the student activity fees they 
paid can be withheld from student publications with which they disagree–is provided by Board of 
Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth (hereinafter referred to as 
Southworth).597  In Southworth, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment 
permits public universities to charge mandatory student activity fees to fund extracurricular student 
speech if the funds are allocated in a viewpoint-neutral manner.598  The Court also ruled in 
Southworth that the university was not required to implement an optional payment or refund 
system to accommodate those students who complain that the student fees they paid support 
                                                   
587 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
588 Id. at 845-46. 
589 Id. at 825-26. 
590 Id. at 824.  A “religious activity” was defined as any activity that “primarily promotes or manifests a 
particular belief about a deity.”  Id. at 825. 
591 Id. at 827. 
592 Id.  
593 Id. at 828-29, 837. 
594 Id. at 829. 
595 Id. at 830-31.  “The Guideline invoked by the University to deny third-party contractor payments on behalf 
of [Wide Awake Publications] effects a sweeping restriction on student thought and student inquiry in the 
context of University sponsored publications.”  Id. at 836. 
596 Id. at 840-41. 
597 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
598 Id. at 234. 
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content or viewpoint to which they object, because the content and viewpoint neutrality 
requirement of the university is sufficient to protect the rights of the complaining students.599 
Both Rosenberger and Southworth have bearing on the mandatory fees imposed by the USDA 
on the beef, mushroom and fruit producers to finance commercial messages to which the producers 
objected.  The mandatory fees collected from students supported activities and publications that 
enhanced the education of university students; the mandatory fees collected from beef, mushrooms 
and fruit producers supported advertisements that enhanced public awareness of the value of food 
products.  Likewise, in both instances, government agencies required university students or food 
producers respectively to pay fees that financed expression, and individuals paying the mandatory 
fees objected to being associated with the ensuing message.  While Rosenberger and Southworth 
occurred in an educational setting and Livestock Marketing, United Foods and Wileman Bros. 
occurred in a commercial setting, all of the decisions involved government agencies that employed 
procedural or regulatory programs of compelled financing of speech.  The main difference between 
Rosenberger and Southworth on the one hand, and Livestock Marketing, United Foods and 
Wileman Bros. on the other, is that the universities claimed they were not the speakers but merely 
supported and encouraged students’ speech.600  In contrast, food producers in Livestock Marketing, 
United Foods and Wileman Bros. were required to support financially generic advertisements that 
were government speech.  In the former instance, the state-related universities cannot make 
content-based choices; in the latter instance, the government agency may make content-based 
choices.601  Hence, under Rosenberger and Southworth the government may require food 
producers to pay mandatory fees to support advertisements for food products even if the 
government agency employs content or viewpoint discrimination.  
 
 
III. COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH DECISIONS 
 
A. ANALYSIS OF WILEMAN BROS. 
 
In Wileman Bros.602 the United States Supreme Court ruled that compelling growers and 
handlers of nectarines, peaches, and plums to contribute money to pay for an advertising campaign 
for California fruits constitutes a valid economic regulation within the Commerce Clause and does 
not violate the First Amendment.603  The Court determined initially that the USDA regulatory 
scheme did not raise an issue of speech but constituted only an issue of economic regulation 
implemented through marketing orders.604  In doing so, the Court emphasized three characteristics 
of the regulatory scheme: the marketing orders (1) did not stop any producer from communicating 
any message, (2) did not force anyone to engage in actual or symbolic speech, and (3) did not 
mandate any endorsement or financing of a political viewpoint.605  Hence, because the 
advertisements did not trigger fundamental First Amendment implications, the Court concluded 
that the USDA marketing orders should be reviewed like other governmental regulatory 
                                                   
599 Id. at 230. 
600 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834-35; Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229. 
601 Rosenberger at 833 (“[W]hen the State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices.  When the 
University determines the content of the education it provides, it is the University speaking, and we have 
permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or when 
it enlists private entities to convey its own message.  . . .  [W]hen the government appropriates public funds 
to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes.  When the government disburses 
public funds to private entities to convey a government message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps 
to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.”) 
602 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997). 
603 Id. at 469.  See 8 ABA PREVIEW, July 8, 1997, at 63. 
604 Id. at 476. 
605 Id. at 469-70. 
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programs.606  The Court also eschewed the fruit producers’ and handlers’ objections that they were 
forced to finance a generic advertising program in violation of the First Amendment.81F607  
Unfortunately, this conclusion is belied by the record before the Court, which demonstrates that the 
fruit producers strenuously objected to the advertising because it associated them with their 
competitors’ products.  Hence, the Court created an erroneous distinction that removed the fruit 
producers’ and handlers’ objections from the purview of the First Amendment and enabled the 
Court to decide that the USDA could make producers and growers pay for advertisements with 
which they did not want to be associated.  The compelled speech was simply ancillary to a broader 
regulatory program.  This distinction eliminates any need to evaluate the compulsory nature of the 
marketing orders under the First Amendment, and denigrates First Amendment protections against 
compelled speech.   
 
B. ANALYSIS OF UNITED FOODS 
 
In United Foods,82F608 the United States Supreme Court decided that assessments imposed on the 
mushroom industry for generic advertising programs designed to promote the industry under the 
Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act of 1990 (hereinafter “the 
Mushroom Act”),83F609 violated the First Amendment.  The Court determined that the assessments 
were not ancillary to a more comprehensive regulatory program; rather, the advertising in question 
was the main component of the regulatory scheme.84F610    
The court initially noted that the First Amendment prevents the government from prohibiting 
speech, from compelling individuals to express certain views,85F611 and from requiring individuals to 
subsidize speech to which they object.86F612  The Court then applied those First Amendment 
protections to commercial speech:  
 
The fact that the speech is in aid of a commercial purpose does not deprive 
respondent of all First Amendment protection . . . .  The subject matter of 
the speech may be of interest to but a small segment of the population; yet 
those whose business and livelihood depend in some way upon the product 
involved no doubt deem First Amendment protection to be just as important 
for them as it is for other discrete, little noticed groups in a society which 
                                                   
606 Id. at 469-70. 
607 Id. at 470-71.  The Court stated:  
Our compelled speech case law . . . is clearly inapplicable to the regulatory scheme at issue here.  The 
use of assessments to pay for advertising does not require respondents to repeat an objectionable 
message out of their own mouths, require them to use their own property to convey an antagonistic 
ideological message, force them to respond to a hostile message when they ‘would prefer to remain 
silent,’  . . . or require them to be publicly identified or associated with another’s message . . . 
Respondents are not required themselves to speak, but are merely required to make contributions for 
advertising.  With trivial exceptions on which the Court did not rely, none of the generic advertising 
conveys any message with which respondents disagree.  Furthermore, the advertising is attributed not to 
them, but to the California Tree Fruit Agreement or California Summer Fruits [citations omitted]. 
608 United States v. United Foods, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 2334 (2001). 
609 7 U.S.C. § 6101.  
610 United Foods, 121 S. Ct. at 2341. In reaching its decision, the United States Supreme Court focused its 
attention on a narrow issue: “whether the government may underwrite and sponsor speech with a certain 
viewpoint using special subsidies exacted from a designated class of persons, some of whom object to the 
idea being advanced.”  Id.  By framing the issue this way, the Court indicated its receptiveness to the defense 
of government speech. 
611 Id. at 2338, citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) and W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624 (1943). 
612 United Foods, 121 S. Ct. at 2338, citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and Keller v. 
State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990). 
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values the freedom resulting from speech in all its diverse parts.  First 
Amendment concerns apply here because of the requirement that producers 
subsidize speech with which they disagree.87F613 
 
United Foods wanted to advertise its mushrooms as branded and superior in quality; the USDA 
advertising message promoted generic mushrooms.88F614  Hence the USDA forced the mushroom 
producers to subsidize government speech with which the producers did not want to be associated.  
This compelled financial support of speech troubled the Court,89F615 and, in order to escape its 
statement in Wileman Bros. that the marketing orders did not raise First Amendment concerns,90F616 
the Court attempted to distinguish Wileman Bros. and United Foods.  In doing so, the Court 
focused on the regulatory nature of the marketing orders in Wileman Bros., noting (1) that the 
California fruit advertising program was ancillary to a comprehensive USDA program,91F617 and (2) 
that the mushroom advertising program in United Foods was a central component of the USDA’s 
regulatory scheme.92F618  Hence, the Wileman Bros. regulatory scheme required financial support of a 
comprehensive regulatory program, only a small part of which involved fruit advertisement. 93F619  
The regulatory scheme in United Foods, however, devoted almost all of the collected funds for one 
purpose, generic advertising.94F620   
Having so distinguished Wileman Bros. and United Foods, the Court applied Street, Abood, and 
Keller to invalidate the United Foods regulatory scheme as violative of the First Amendment.95F621  
The explicit attachment of First Amendment protections against compelled speech and compelled 
financing of speech to commercial speech is a First Amendment gain, though as noted below the 
constitutional victory may be hollow.  Moreover, the Court backed away from its conclusion in 
Wileman that marketing orders do not force individuals to speak or endorse the speech of others, 
but merely mandates the financing of advertising,96F622 and concluded that mandatory assessments 




                                                   
613 United Foods, 121 S. Ct. at 2338. 
614 Id.  
615 Id.  (“First Amendment values are at serious risk if the government can compel a particular citizen, or a 
discrete group of citizens, to pay special subsidies for speech on the side that it favors; and there is no 
apparent principle which distinguishes out of hand minor debates about whether a branded mushroom is 
better than just any mushroom. As a consequence, the compelled funding for the advertising must pass First 
Amendment scrutiny.”) 
616 Wileman Bros., 521 U.S. at 469. 
617 United Foods, 121 U.S. at 2339. 
618 Id. 
619 Id. 
620 Id.  The Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit that “the mushroom growing business . . . is unregulated, except 
for the enforcement of a regional mushroom advertising program,” and “the mushroom market has not been 
collectivized, exempted from antitrust laws, subjected to a uniform price, or otherwise subsidized through 
price supports or restrictions on supply.”  Id. 
621 Id. 
622 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 470-71 (1997). 
623 United States v. United Foods, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 2334, 2340 (2001).  The Court observed:  
It is true that the party who protests the assessment here is required simply to support speech by others, not to 
utter the speech itself.  We conclude, however, that the mandated support is contrary to the First Amendment 
principles set forth in cases involving expression by groups which include persons who object to the speech, 
but who, nevertheless, must remain members of the group by law or necessity. 
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Unfortunately, these distinctions are so torturously drawn by the Court that United Food’s 
rationale is difficult to comprehend and apply.624  In effect, First Amendment protections apply 
only if (1) an association member objects to the commercial speech, (2) the commercial speech is 
only indirectly related to the central purpose of the required association, and (3) the association 
itself is “part of a far broader regulatory system that is not principally concerned with the speech in 
question.”99F625  What that means may be anyone’s guess.  Hence, any First Amendment victory 
contained in United Foods is uncertain at best.   
 
C. ANALYSIS OF LIVESTOCK MARKETING 
 
In Livestock Marketing, the United States Supreme Court upheld a mandatory assessment of $1 
per head of cattle sold or imported to finance market and food science research into the nutritional 
value of beef and promotional campaigns to market beef domestically and overseas.100F626  Two beef 
producer associations and several beef ranchers objected to the assessment, because the 
promotional campaigns focused on beef as a generic product which impeded their efforts to 
promote the superiority of American beef, grain-fed beef, or certified Angus or Hereford beef.101F627  
In addressing the beef producers’ First Amendment objection to the mandatory assessment 
program, the Court initially reiterated the holdings of Barnette, Maynard, Keller, and Abood, and 
acknowledged that those decisions led the Court in United Foods to “sustain a compelled subsidy 
challenge to an assessment very similar to the beef checkoff, imposed to fund mushroom 
advertising.”102F628  The Court emphasized, however, that its decision in United Foods was based on 
“the assumption that the advertising was private speech, not government speech.”103F629  Likewise, 
because the mushroom assessment in United Foods was not part of a “broader regulatory scheme” 
but was created solely to fund advertising for mushrooms, the nature of the program was purely 
compelled speech contrary to the First Amendment.104F630   
Notably, the Government did not argue in either Wileman Bros. or United Foods that the use of 
mandatory assessments to fund generic advertisements was permissible government speech;105F631 
hence, the Court could not consider the defense of government speech in either decision.106F632  The 
Government in Livestock Marketing, however, contended at trial and on appeal that the beef 
assessment “survives First Amendment scrutiny because it funds only government speech.”107F633  
This permitted the United States Supreme Court to take an entirely new tack in resolving the 
compelled southernlawjournal  
                                                   
624 The compelled speech in Wileman Bros. was merely supportive of the highly regulated nature of the 
California fruit industry, and hence did not violate the First Amendment (just as union members cannot 
object to payments supporting the primary role of the union to represent the workers in the negotiating 
process).  On the other hand, the compelled speech in United Foods did not promote collective “group 
action,” except to “generate the very speech to which some handlers object,” and compelled subsidies for 
speech should not be upheld if “their principal object is speech itself.” Hence, the Abood rationale applies, 
and “the assessments are not permitted under the First Amendment.” 
625 Id. at 2341. 
626 Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n., 125 S. Ct. 2055, 2059, 2066 (2005). 
627 Id. at 2060. 
628 Id. at 2061. 
629 Id.  
630 Id. 
631 Id. at 2061 note 3. 
632 The door to the government speech defense was opened in Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 12-
13 (1990): “If every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds express a view with 
which he disagreed, debate over issue of great concern to the public would be limited to those in the public 
sector, and the process of government as we know it radically transformed. 
633 Id. at 2060. 
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speech aspects of the beef assessment program: classifying the assessment program as compelled 
government speech outside the purview of the First Amendment.108F634   
The Court determined that the Federal Government itself effectively controlled the promotional 
beef campaign,109F635 that the message contained in the beef promotion was established by the Federal 
Government,110F636 that Congress and the Secretary of USDA specified the central message and its 
elements, 111F637 that the Secretary has final approval authority to control every word used in the 
promotional campaign,112F638 and that the government set the overall message to be communicated and 
approved every word that is disseminated.113F639 Because of the government’s pervasive authority over 
the beef promotion, the Court had little difficulty in concluding that the government speech 
defense applied and eradicated the beef producers’ First Amendment objections to the beef 
assessment program.114F640   
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION: DEMISE OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION  
FROM COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
 
As noted in section II, various United States Supreme Court decisions have established 
significant First Amendment protections against compelled political speech.  The Wooley v. 
Maynard115F641 decision held that one cannot be required to “participate in the dissemination of 
information . . . in a manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and read by the 
public.”116F642  In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc.,117F643 the Court ruled 
that the imposition of a reasonable fee limitation on charitable solicitors was an unreasonable 
burden on protected speech and not narrowly tailored to the State’s interest in preventing fraud.118F644  
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,119F645 the Court ruled 
that a parade is not a public accommodation but an expression of speech,120F646 and that parade 
organizers have the authority to choose the content of their own message, that is, they may choose 
the contingents permitted to parade, and hence pick and choose the ideas conveyed in the 
parade.121F647  In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Court ruled that compelling the BSA to reinstate 
an assistant scoutmaster who was an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist compromised the 
BSA’s official policy of considering homosexual activity to be immoral, and that the BSA was 
                                                   
634 Id at 2062.  The Court noted:  
‘Compelled support of government’–even those programs of government one does not approve of–is of 
course perfectly constitutional, as every taxpayer must attest.  And some government programs involve, or 
entirely consist of, advocating a position.  ‘The government, as a general rule, may support valid programs 
and policies by taxes or other exactions binding on protesting parties.  Within this broader principle it seems 
inevitable that funds raised by the government will be spent for speech and other expression to advocate and 
defend its own policies.’  We have generally assumed, though not yet squarely held, that compelled funding 
of government speech does not alone raise First Amendment concerns.   
635 Id.  
636 Id.  
637 Id. at 2063. 
638 Id. 
639 Id.  
640 Id. at 2066 
641 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
642 Id. at 713. 
643 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n. of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
644 Id. at 789-90. 
645 Supra note 26. 
646 Id. at 568, 572-73.   
647 Id. at 573. 
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permitted to deny membership and leadership positions to individuals practicing lifestyles contrary 
to the BSA’s organizational values and mission.648 
Similarly, individuals have the right not to support or contribute to political or ideological 
causes with which they disagree, and not to have their organizational dues, fees and assessments 
applied to support causes with which they do not wish to be associated.  This was affirmed in 
Street, Abood, and Keller reviewed above.  Each of those decisions explicitly recognized the right 
of an organization to collect fees such as union dues or professional association dues for purposes 
connected with collective bargaining, contract administration, and professional regulation.  Each of 
the decisions expressly prohibited the use of such fees to support a political or ideological cause to 
which the union member or professional member does not subscribe.  
While those First Amendment protections are compelling, the United States Supreme Court has 
vacillated when asked to extend them to the arena of commercial speech.  In Wileman Bros., the 
Court eschewed any expansion of those protections in instances involving compelled speech that 
were only a minor part of a broader regulatory scheme.   
In United Foods, the Court unleashed a convoluted theory that provides First Amendment 
protections against compelled commercial speech and compelled financing of commercial speech 
when (1) the commercial speech is not directly related to or supportive of the purpose of the 
compelled association, and (2) the association is simply a part of a larger regulatory scheme not 
concerned principally with speech.  These two torturously drawn elements are difficult to 
understand and appear to have little application beyond mandatory membership in associations 
strenuously regulated by the government.  Hence any First Amendment protection delivered by 
United Foods is uncertain at best.  
In Livestock Marketing, the Court readily used the government speech defense to squelch further 
attempts to extend protections against compelled political speech and compelled financing of 
political speech to the commercial arena, perhaps to foreclose a tumult of ensuing litigation.  
Generic ad campaigns have been litigated over “California tree fruits, mushrooms, beef, milk, 
avocados, grapes, apples, port, and alligators,” and court dockets are “littered with these types of 
cases.”123F649  To the extent that the government sets the overall message to be communicated and 
approves the wording of the generic advertisements as part of an advertising assessment program 
to promote consumption of agricultural products and livestock, the government speech defense will 
cleanse dockets of First Amendment challenges to USDA marketing orders. 
Unlike state-related universities which may assess student fees to support speech and expression 
but cannot engage in content or viewpoint discrimination, government agencies may assess fees to 
finance their own speech and freely engage in content and viewpoint discrimination.  In both cases, 
individuals may be forced to be associated with and pay for messages with which they disagree.124F650  
Following Wileman Bros., one commentator was concerned that “[i]t seems anomalous for the 
Court to protect advertising when the government tries to restrict it, but abandon it as nonspeech 
when the government compels it,”125F651 and that:  
 
                                                   
648 Supra note 31, at 656. 
649 Daniel L. Hudson. Are Generic Beef Ads Examples of Unconstitutional Compelled Speech or Permissible 
Government Speech?, 3 ABA PREVIEW 173, 175 (2004). 
650 This may not be so threatening as it may appear at first.  To the extent government agencies assess fees to 
support speech and expression, the prohibition on government content and viewpoint discrimination protects 
free speech.  Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 230, 233 (2000).  
To the extent government agencies assess fees to support government speech, democratic processes check 
government overreach, and make government agencies accountable for the use of tax revenues to pay for 
government fostered messages.  Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 125 S. Ct. 2055, 2064 (2005); Board 
of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000), and Rosenberger v. Rector 
and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).   
651 Commercial Speech–Compelled Advertising, 111 HARVARD L. REV. 319, 325 (1997). 
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[G]overnment may have ‘free rein’ to ‘force payment for a whole variety of 
expressive conduct that it could not restrict.’  The danger is that instead of 
taking responsibility for messages that it wishes to foster -- and being held 
accountable by the public for using tax dollars to do so --  government can 
surreptitiously communicate its message through the pocketbooks of private 
speakers.126F652 
 
Following Livestock Marketing, the concern may very well be that the government can compel 
commercial speech and its financing by structuring it as government speech.  The pitfalls created 
by the defense of government speech are underscored by the highly regulated nature of various 
industries–e.g., energy, health care, and transportation–and the difficulty in drawing a clear line 
between commercial and political speech127F653–e.g., advertisements for nuclear energy, family 
planning, and hybrid vehicles.  While the First Amendment may preclude the government from 
restricting such advertisements, Livestock Marketing may empower the government to compel 
companies to finance such advertisements.   
In the authors’ judgment, further attempts to apply First Amendment restrictions against 
compelled political speech and compelled financing of commercial speech to commercial speech 
are fruitless, because the defense of government speech trumps those claims.  Without violating the 
First Amendment, government agencies may henceforth not only mandate advertising programs 
but freely employ content and viewpoint discrimination in crafting the advertisements.  May First 
Amendment protection of compelled commercial speech rest in peace.   
 
                                                   
652 Id. at 329. 
653 See Commercial Speech–Compelled Advertising, supra note 123 at 327-28 (“Lower Courts could read 
Wileman Bros. to foreclose First Amendment protection of nonpolitical or nonideological advertising even 
when there is actual disagreement about the advertising content.  Increasingly advertisers are utilizing 
controversial, eye-catching imagery that–although not overtly political–may be equally objectionable.  But if 
Justice Souter’s interpretation of the majority’s analysis–that the critical requirement is that speech must be 
political or ideological, regardless whether there is actual disagreement–is correct, then government may be 
constitutionally able to compel nonpolitical but clearly objectionable speech.”). 
 
  
 
